Optionen und Latente Steuerbiss Umsetzung der FASB-Statement-Nr. 123 (R) geht es darum, eine Methode zur Bewertung der Mitarbeiteraktienoptionen auszuwählen. CPAs müssen auch Unternehmen helfen, die notwendigen Steuererklärungen anzupassen, um die steuerlichen Vorteile der aktienbasierten Vergütung richtig zu verfolgen. Statement-Nr. 123 (R) verlangt von den Gesellschaften die Verwendung der latenten Steuerbilanz für Mitarbeiteraktienoptionen. Ein Optionssteuerattribut bestimmt, ob eine abzugsfähige temporäre Differenz entsteht, wenn das Unternehmen den optionalen Vergütungsaufwand in seinen Abschlüssen erkennt. Unternehmen werden nicht qualifizierte und Anreizoptionen unterschiedlich behandeln. Unternehmen, die nicht dem Fair Value-Ansatz von Statement No. 123 muss für alle nach dem 15. Dezember 1994 gewährten Vergütungen eine Eröffnungsbilanz für überschüssige Steueransprüche begründen, als ob das Unternehmen die Aktienoptionen unter dieser Aussage schon immer bilanziert hätte. Um dies zu tun, müssen die CPA eine Grant-by-Grant-Analyse der steuerlichen Auswirkungen der gewährten, geänderten, abgewickelten, verfallenen oder ausgeübten Optionen nach dem Inkrafttreten des Statements Nr. 123. Bestimmte außergewöhnliche Situationen können eine besondere Behandlung erfordern. Dazu gehören Fälle, in denen Mitarbeiter eine Option vor ihrer Freizügigkeit verfällt, storniert das Unternehmen eine Option nach der Gewährleistung oder eine Option läuft nicht ausgeübt, in der Regel, weil es unter Wasser ist. CPAs müssen auch vorsichtig von möglichen Fallstricke sein, wenn Optionen unter Wasser sind, wenn das Unternehmen in anderen Ländern mit unterschiedlichen Steuergesetzen arbeitet oder einen Nettoverlust hat. Berechnen des Anfangs-APIC-Pools und der laufenden Steuerberechnungen, die in der Aussagen-Nr. 123 (R) ist ein komplexer Prozess, der sorgfältige Aufzeichnungen erfordert. Die neu genehmigte vereinfachte Methode fügt noch eine Reihe von Berechnungen Unternehmen müssen durchführen. CPAs sollten die Unternehmen ermutigen, diese Berechnungen so schnell wie möglich zu beginnen, da einige die Erfassung historischer Informationen erfordern. Nancy Nichols, CPA, PhD, ist Associate Professor für Buchhaltung an der James Madison University in Harrisonburg, Va. Ihre E-Mail-Adresse ist nicholnbjmu. edu. Luis Betancourt, CPA, PhD, ist Assistent Professor für Buchhaltung an der James Madison University. Seine E-Mail-Adresse ist betanclxjmu. edu. Ouve machte die notwendige Bewertungsmethodenentscheidung und half dem Unternehmen, eine Adoptionsmethode zu wählen. Jetzt ist es Zeit, sich zurückzulehnen und entspannen, während andere Unternehmen kämpfen, um die Umsetzung FASB Statement Nr. 123 (überarbeitet), Anteilsbasierte Vergütung. Aber warte. Bevor Sie zu bequem, gibt es andere Unternehmen Unternehmen, die Ausgabe von Aktien-basierte Entschädigung muss sich mit. Während Bewertungsprobleme den Löwenanteil der Aufmerksamkeit erhalten haben, müssen CPAs auch ungewissen Firmen helfen, mit Aussage Nr. 123 (R) s Steuerimplikationen. Veränderung ist unvermeidlich In Erwartung der obligatorischen Aufwendungen für Aktienoptionen haben 71 der Unternehmen ihre langfristigen Mitarbeiteranreizprogramme überarbeitet oder planen. Quelle: Hewitt Associates, Lincolnshire, Ill. Hewitt. Die Steuerregelung unter der Erläuterung Nr. 123 (R) komplex sind. Sie erfordern eine steuerliche Begünstigung aus aktienorientierten Vergütungen auf der Grundlage einer Zuschuss - und Landeszulassung. Darüber hinaus müssen Unternehmen, um die Auswirkungen der künftigen Transaktionen auf die Gewinn - und Verlustrechnung zu reduzieren, eine 10-jährige Geschichte der Aktienoptionsaktivitäten vorbereiten, um die Höhe des APIC-Pools zu ermitteln. Dieser Artikel beschreibt die relevanten Steuer-und Rechnungswesen so CPAs können helfen, Arbeitgeber und Kunden erfüllen die neuen Anforderungen leichter. DER HINTERGRUND FASB hat die Erklärung Nr. 123 (R) im Dezember 2004. Nach der früheren Erklärung Nr. 123 hatten die Unternehmen die Wahl zur Bilanzierung von aktienbasierten Vergütungen nach der inhärenten Wertmethode der APB Opinion no. 25, Bilanzierung von Aktien an Mitarbeiter oder Fair Value-Methode. Die meisten verwendeten die intrinsische Wert Methode. Statement-Nr. 123 (R) beseitigt diese Wahl und verlangt von den Unternehmen, die Fair-Value-Methode zu verwenden. Zur Schätzung des beizulegenden Zeitwerts von Mitarbeiteroptionen müssen Unternehmen ein Optionspreismodell wie Black-Scholes-Merton oder Gitter einsetzen. Neben der Auswahl eines Pricing-Modells müssen Unternehmen die latenten steuerlichen Auswirkungen von Aufwandsoptionen auf Basis des beizulegenden Zeitwertes berücksichtigen. Mit FASB Mitarbeiterstelle Nr. 123 (R) -3, so dass die meisten Unternehmen bis mindestens 11. November 2006, eine Methode für die Berechnung der Pool von überschüssigen Steuervorteilen zu bestimmen, gibt es noch Zeit für CPAs, um Unternehmen bei der Vorbereitung für die latente Steuer Fragen Statement Nr. 123 (R) erzeugt. DEFERRED TAX ACCOUNTING Erklärung Nr. 123 (R) verlangt von den Gesellschaften die Verwendung der latenten Steuerbilanz für Mitarbeiteraktienoptionen. Eine Optionssteuerattribute bestimmt, ob eine abzugsfähige temporäre Differenz entsteht, wenn ein Unternehmen den optionalen Vergütungsaufwand in seinen Abschlüssen erkennt. Nichtqualifizierte Aktienoptionen (NQSOs). Wenn ein Unternehmen einem Mitarbeiter einen NQSO gewährt, erkennt er den damit verbundenen Vergütungsaufwand an und erfasst eine Steuervergünstigung, die dem Vergütungsaufwand multipliziert mit dem Unternehmensteuersatz entspricht. Dies schafft einen latenten Steueranspruch, weil das Unternehmen einen Abschlussprüfungsabzug nimmt, der derzeit nicht für Einkommensteuerzwecke abzugsfähig ist. Wenn ein Mitarbeiter ein NQSO ausübt, vergleicht das Unternehmen den zulässigen Steuerabzug mit dem entsprechenden früheren Rechnungsabgrenzungsaufwand und vergütet die Steuervergünstigung, die mit einem etwaigen Steuerabzug für APIC verbunden ist. Mit anderen Worten, die CPAs sollten den tatsächlichen Steuerertrag mit dem latenten Steueranspruch vergleichen und einen Überschuss zum Eigenkapital anstelle der Gewinn - und Verlustrechnung bewerten. Ist der Steuerabzug unter dem Bilanzausweisaufwand, wird die Abschreibung der verbleibenden latenten Steueransprüche dem APIC-Pool belastet. Überschreitet der Betrag den Pool, wird der Überschuss mit dem Einkommen verrechnet. Ein Unternehmen latente Steuerguthaben unterscheidet sich in der Regel von seiner realisierten Steuervorteil. Denken Sie an die latenten Steueransprüche als Schätzung auf der Grundlage der für Buchzwecke erfassten Vergütungskosten. Unternehmen sollten nicht erwarten, dass die latenten Steuerguthaben den steuerlichen Nutzen ausgleichen, den sie letztlich erhalten. Abbildung 1 veranschaulicht die Bilanzierung von NQSOs und latenten Steuern. Am 1. Januar 2006 gewährt XYZ Corp. Jane Smith Optionen auf 100 Aktien. Die Optionen haben einen Ausübungspreis von 10 (Aktienkurs am Tag der Gewährung), Weste am Ende von drei Jahren und haben einen fairen Wert von 3. Alle Optionen werden erwartet, um Weste. Somit sind die über den Zeitraum von drei Jahren zu erfassenden Vergütungskosten 300 (100 Optionen X 3). Unter der Annahme eines Steuersatzes von 35 Jahren werden in den Jahren 2006, 2007 und 2008 die gleichen Zeitschrifteneingaben vorgenommen, um die Entschädigungskosten und die damit verbundenen latenten Steuern festzuhalten: Dr. Compensation Cost Cr. Aufgezahltes Kapital (Zur Anrechnung der Vergütungskosten) Dr. Latente Steueransprüche (Zur Berücksichtigung eines latenten Steueranspruchs für die temporäre Differenz im Zusammenhang mit den Aufwandsentschädigungen) Der Saldo der latenten Steueransprüche beläuft sich Ende 2008 auf 105 und 300 Euro Kapitalrücklage. Angenommen, Smith übt ihre Optionen im Jahr 2009, wenn der Aktienkurs 30 pro Aktie ist. Wenn XYZs Stammaktien keine Stückaktien sind, würde sie die Übung wie folgt aufzeichnen: APIC POOL Statement No. 123 (R) bietet zwei Übergangsalternativen: die modifizierte prospektive Methode und die modifizierte retrospektive Methode mit Anpassung. Darüber hinaus Personal Position Nr. 123 (R) -3, die FASB auf ihrer Website am 11. November 2005 veröffentlicht hat, bietet eine dritte vereinfachte Option an. In allen Fällen müssen CPAs Unternehmen helfen, die Höhe der anrechenbaren Mehrwertsteuervorteile (APIC-Pool) am Annahmetermin zu berechnen. Dies ist wichtig, weil hilft vermeiden, eine zusätzliche Gewinn-und Verlustrechnung Ergebnis für künftige Option Übungen oder Stornierungen. Unternehmen, die dem Fair Value-Ansatz des ursprünglichen Statement no. 123 muss eine Eröffnungsbilanz für überschüssige Steuervergünstigungen in der APIC geschaffen werden, die sich auf alle in den nach dem 15. Dezember 1994 beginnenden Prämien bezogenen und abgegoltenen Prämien bezieht, so als ob die Gesellschaft die Aktienzuteilungen nach dem Statement Nr. 123 Ansatz entlang. Diese Unternehmen sollten auch bestimmen, was ihre aktive latente Steuer hätten sie gefolgt hätte Statement Nr. 123s Anerkennungsbestimmungen. Wenn nach Annahme der Erklärung Nr. 123 (R), ein Unternehmen Buchaufwand auf eine Option Ausübung ist größer als der Steuerabzug, wird die Differenz, bereinigt um Steuern auf die bestehenden APIC-Pool angewendet. Sie hat keine Auswirkung auf das laufende Geschäftsjahr. Ohne den APIC-Pool wäre die steuerbereinigte Differenz ein zusätzlicher Aufwand aus der Gewinn - und Verlustrechnung. Offensichtlich dauert die Berechnung des Anfangs-APIC-Pools und der aktiven latenten Steuern einige Zeit. Die CPA müssen eine Grant-by-Grant-Analyse der Steuereffekte aller ausgegebenen, geänderten, abgewickelten, verfallenen oder ausgeübten Optionen nach dem Inkrafttreten der ursprünglichen Erklärung Nr. 123. (Diese Feststellung war für Geschäftsjahre, die nach dem 15. Dezember 1995 beginnen, wirksam. Für Unternehmen, die den Ansatz von Opinion Nr. 25 weiterhin nutzen, sind Pro-forma-Angaben erforderlich, um die Auswirkungen aller in den Geschäftsjahren, 1994). Für Unternehmen, die die Anerkennungsvorschrift der Stellungnahme Nr. 25, ein guter Ausgangspunkt werden die Informationen zuvor für Statement Nr. Verwendet werden. 123 Offenlegung Zwecke. Die Steuererklärungsvorbereitungsdateien sollten Informationen über ausgeübte NQSOs und ISO-disqualifizierte Dispositionen enthalten. Personalabteilung Dateien können eine weitere gute Quelle von Informationen. Obwohl die Erfassung auf Zuschussbasis erfolgen muss, werden letztlich die Mehrwertsteuervorteile und die Steuerermäßigungen für jeden Zuschuss verrechnet, um den APIC-Pool zu ermitteln. Die vor dem Datum des Inkrafttretens der Erklärung Nr. 123 sind von der Berechnung ausgeschlossen. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin Nr. 107 sagt, dass ein Unternehmen den APIC-Pool nur dann berechnen muss, wenn er einen aktuellen Zeitraum hat. Angesichts der Schwierigkeiten, 10-jährige Informationen zu erhalten, sollten Unternehmen diese Berechnung so schnell wie möglich beginnen, falls dies erforderlich ist. DER VEREINFACHTE ANSATZ Eine neuere FASB-Personalposition ermöglicht es Unternehmen, einen einfacheren Ansatz zur Berechnung der Anfangsbilanz des APIC-Pools zu wählen. Nach dieser Methode entspricht der Anfangsbestand der Differenz zwischen Alle in den Unternehmensabschlüssen erfassten Erhöhungen der Kapitalrücklage im Zusammenhang mit steuerlichen Vergünstigungen aus aktienbasierten Vergütungen in den Zeiträumen nach Annahme der Statement-Nr. 123 aber vor der Annahme der Erklärung Nr. 123 (R). Der kumulative inkrementelle Vergütungsaufwand, der während des gleichen Zeitraums offenbart wird, multipliziert mit dem derzeitigen gemischten gesetzlichen Steuersatz des Unternehmens, wenn er die Aussage Nr. 123 (R). Der gemischte Steuersatz enthält föderale, staatliche, lokale und ausländische Steuern. Kumulative inkrementelle Kompensation ist der Aufwand, der unter Verwendung der Anweisungs-Nr. 123 abzüglich der Kosten mit der Stellungnahme Nr. 25. Die Aufwendungen sollten Ausgleichskosten beinhalten, die mit Prämien verbunden sind, die zum Zeitpunkt der Adoption teilweise ausbezahlt wurden. Unternehmen haben ein Jahr ab dem Datum ihrer Annahme Statement Nr. 123 (R) oder 10. November 2005, um eine Methode zur Berechnung des APIC-Pools auszuwählen. DURCHFÜHRUNG DER GRANT-BY-GRANT TRACKING Unternehmen bestimmen, ob eine Arbeitnehmerausübung eines NQSO eine Überschusssteuer oder einen Mangel auf der Grundlage einer Zuschussvergütung begründet, indem sie die Vergütungsaufwendungen und die damit verbundenen latenten Steueransprüche, die sie für jede einzelne Zuwendung aufgezeichnet haben, betrachtet Den Betrag der latenten Steueransprüche aus der Bilanz zu entnehmen. Die latenten Steuern auf alle nicht ausgeübten Prämien werden nicht berücksichtigt. Wenn der Arbeitnehmer nur einen Teil der Optionsausübung ausübt, wird nur die aktive latente Steuer auf den ausgeübten Teil aus der Bilanz entlastet. STRADDLING DES WIRKSAMEN DATUMS Viele Unternehmen, die die modifizierte, prospektive Bewerbungsmethode verwenden, haben NQSOs, die vor dem Erlass von Statement No. 123 (R). Wenn die Mitarbeiter diese Optionen ausüben, sollte die Gesellschaft die Verringerung der laufenden Steuern, die als Kredit an APIC fällig sind, in dem Umfang erfassen, in dem sie den latenten Steueranspruch übersteigt, falls vorhanden. Im Folgenden wird die Auswirkung von NQSOs dargestellt, die das Datum des Inkrafttretens überschreiten. UNGÜLTIGE SITUATIONEN CPAs, die die steuerlichen Aspekte von Statement No. 123 (R) können einige einmalige Umstände auftreten. Verfall vor dem Vesting. Mitarbeiter, die ein Unternehmen verlassen, verlieren häufig ihre Optionen vor dem Ausübungstermin. Wenn dies geschieht, wendet das Unternehmen die Vergütung, einschließlich aller Steuervorteile, die es zuvor erkannt. Stornierung nach Vesting. Verlässt ein Mitarbeiter das Unternehmen nach der Optionsübernahme, ohne diese auszuüben, werden die Optionen aufgehoben. Wenn die NQSOs nach der Gewährleistung aufgehoben werden, wird der Ausgleich nicht rückgängig gemacht, sondern die aktive latente Steuer. Die Ausbuchung wird zunächst der APIC in dem Umfang in Rechnung gestellt, in dem es sich um kumulative Kredite im APIC-Pool aus der vorherigen Erfassung von Steuervorteilen handelt. Ein Restbetrag wird über die Gewinn - und Verlustrechnung des Unternehmens verbucht. Ablauf. Viele nicht qualifizierte Optionen verfallen nicht ausgeübt, in der Regel, weil die Optionen sind unter Wasser (dh der Optionspreis ist höher als die Aktien aktuellen Marktpreis). Die gleichen Regeln gelten wie bei der Streichung nach der Ausübung der Ausgleichsaufwand wird nicht rückgängig gemacht, aber die latente Steuer Vermögenswert ist. Die Ab - schreibung wird erstmals dem APIC in Rechnung gestellt, soweit es kumulative Überschusssteueransprüche gibt. Ein verbleibender Betrag wird über die Gewinn - und Verlustrechnung des Unternehmens erfasst. MÖGLICHE PITFALLS Bei der Umsetzung der Anweisung Nr. 123 (R) CPAs müssen in bestimmten Bereichen gewisse Vorsicht anwenden. Latente Steuersätze. Unternehmen, die in mehr als einem Land tätig sind, müssen besonders sorgfältig die Berechnung der latenten Steueransprüche vornehmen. Solche Berechnungen sollten auf Landesebene durchgeführt werden, unter Berücksichtigung der Steuergesetze und - sätze in jedem Jurisdiktion. Steuerrecht über Aktienoption Abzüge variieren auf der ganzen Welt. Einige Länder erlauben keine Abzüge, andere erlauben es ihnen zum Zeitpunkt der Gewährung oder des Ausübungstermins. Unterwasser-Optionen. Wenn eine Option unter Wasser ist, Statement-Nr. 123 (R) gestattet es der Gesellschaft nicht, eine Wertberichtigung auf den latenten Steueranspruch zu erfassen. Wertberichtigungen werden nur erfasst, wenn ein Unternehmen insgesamt steuerliche Position zeigt künftige steuerpflichtige Einkommen wird nicht ausreichen, um alle Vorteile der aktiven latenten Steuern zu realisieren. Der latente Steueranspruch im Zusammenhang mit Unterwasseroptionen kann nur rückgängig gemacht werden, wenn die Optionen storniert, ausgeübt oder nicht ausgeübt werden. Nettoverluste. Eine Gesellschaft kann einen Steuerabzug von einer Optionsübung erhalten, bevor sie die damit verbundene Steuervergünstigung realisiert, da sie einen Netto-Verlustvortrag hat. Wenn das auftritt, erkennt das Unternehmen nicht den Steuervorteil und Kredit an APIC für die zusätzliche Deduktion, bis der Abzug tatsächlich reduziert die Steuern zahlbar. CASH FLOW IMPACT Die Methode, die ein Unternehmen zur Berechnung des APIC-Pools auswählt, hat auch Auswirkungen darauf, wie es realisierte Steuervorteile in seiner Kapitalflussrechnung darstellt. Unter der Statement-Nr. 123 (R) Gesellschaften müssen in der Kapitalflussrechnung einen grundsätzlichen Ansatz zur Berichterstattung über Steuerüberschuss verwenden. Der überschüssige Steuerertrag aus ausgeübten Optionen soll als Mittelzufluss aus Finanzierungstätigkeit und als zusätzlicher Mittelabfluss aus der Geschäftstätigkeit ausgewiesen werden. Überschüssige Steuervorteile können nicht mit steuerlichen Defiziten verrechnet werden. Der als Mittelzufluss aus der Finanzierung ausgewiesene Betrag unterscheidet sich von dem Anstieg der APIC aufgrund überschüssiger Steuervorteile, wenn das Unternehmen im Berichtszeitraum auch Steuerermäßigungen gegenüber APIC erfasst. Unternehmen, die den vereinfachten Ansatz wählen, werden den Gesamtbetrag der Steuergutschrift, die der APIC gutgeschrieben wird, von Optionen berichten, die vor ihrer Annahme vollständig in Anspruch genommen wurden. 123 (R) als Mittelzufluss aus Finanzierungstätigkeit und Mittelabfluss aus laufender Geschäftstätigkeit. Für teilweise gedeckte Optionsrechte oder solche, die nach dem Erlass von Statement No. 123 (R), wird das Unternehmen nur die in der Kapitalflussrechnung ausgewiesenen Steuerüberschüsse berichten. Ein guter Ausgangspunkt für die Berechnung des anfänglichen APIC-Pools und der latenten Steueransprüche sind die Informationen, die das Unternehmen für die Statement-Nr. 123 Offenlegung Zwecke. Steuererklärung Vorbereitung Dateien und Personalakten können auch Informationen über ausgeübte NQSOs und alle ISO disqualifiziert Dispositionen enthalten. Unternehmen müssen den APIC-Pool nur dann berechnen, wenn sie einen Fehlbetrag in der Periode haben. Jedoch angesichts der Schwierigkeit, 10-jährige Informationen zu erhalten, ist es eine gute Idee, diese Berechnung so schnell wie möglich zu beginnen, falls es erforderlich ist. Wenn ein Unternehmen in mehr als einem Land tätig ist, ist bei der Berechnung des latenten Steueranspruchs Vorsicht geboten. Führen Sie die Berechnungen auf einer Land-für-Land-Basis unter Berücksichtigung der Steuergesetze und - sätze in jedem Jurisdiktion. FINALE GEGENSTÄNDE Viele Unternehmen erwägen noch Änderungen an ihren bestehenden Aktienoptionsplänen, bevor sie Statement no. 123 (R). Diejenigen mit Unterwasser-Aktienoptionen entscheiden, ob die Vesting zu beschleunigen, um die Erkennung von Ausgleichsaufwendungen zu vermeiden. Obwohl der Ausgleichsabzug nach dem modifizierten prospektiven Verfahren vermieden werden kann, können die Auswirkungen auf den APIC-Pool nicht vermieden werden. Wenn die Optionen schließlich nicht ausgeübt werden, muss die Gesellschaft den latenten Steueranspruch auf den APIC-Pool im Verhältnis zum Nettoüberschuss steuern. Abhängig von der Größe der Optionsgewährung kann dies den APIC-Pool auf Null reduzieren. Die Ertragsteuerbilanzierungsvorschriften der Statement No. 123 (R) sind sehr komplex. Sowohl die Berechnung des anfänglichen APIC-Pools als auch die laufenden Berechnungen fordern Unternehmen, ein Verfahren zur Verfolgung einzelner Aktienoptionszuschüsse zu entwickeln. Die neuere vereinfachte Methode fügt nur einen weiteren Satz von Berechnungen Unternehmen müssen zu erfüllen. Öffentliche Unternehmen müssen sich auch auf die Ausgestaltung der internen Kontrollen konzentrieren, um die Anforderungen von Section 404 des Sarbanes-Oxley Act zu erfüllen. Kombiniert mit der möglichen Schwierigkeit der Verfolgung von 10-jährigen Informationen, ist die offensichtliche Schlussfolgerung, um jetzt beginnen. Die Entsorgung von Americas Public Lands Die Eisenbahn Land Grants Die Bewegung für Verfall gewinnt Dampf 75 Jahre Land Grant Verfall Die Errungenschaften und Ausfälle von Verfall Das Land Grant Legacy Lebt auf Referenzen zitiert Ich möchte jetzt ein ewiges Monopol von über 50.000.000 Hektar Land von einer riesigen Eisenbahngesellschaft zu verhindern. Ich hoffe, dass der amerikanische Senat. Werden ihre Nachkommen heute nicht durch ihre Handlung dazu veranlassen, ihre Erinnerungen zu verfluchen, um so ein ungeheures Monopol zum Schaden des Landes, zur Unterdrückung und Verletzung aller, die sich in dieser Region niederlassen können, aufzubauen. - U. S. Senator Howell, der 1870 gegen zusätzliche Subventionen an die Nordpazifik-Eisenbahn streitet. Die Möglichkeiten der Macht, die mit einer solchen Konzentration des Grundbesitzes verbunden sind, sind unabhängig vom Holz kaum zu diskutieren. Die Gefahr eines Missbrauchs dieser Macht in der Abwesenheit einer restriktiven Regulierung ist offensichtlich. Diese Gefahr wird darüber hinaus erheblich gesteigert, weil einige der größten Besitzer dieses Landes auch dominierende Positionen im Eisenbahntransport über große Teile des Landes einnehmen. - U. S. Büro der Korporationen, 1913-14. Der Historiker ist weniger daran interessiert, ob die Regierung ein scharfes Schnäppchen fuhr, als er im Schicksal der 174.000.000 Hektar Bundesland und die rund 49.000.000 Hektar Land Land, die den Eisenbahnen angeboten wurden. - Historiker David Maldwyn Ellis, 1946 Der Unterricht der Eisenbahn Land Zuschüsse nach mehr als hundert Jahren ist, dass die Regierung nicht in der Lage war, zu behaupten, und auf der Strecke mit mächtigen wirtschaftlichen Interessen. - Rechtsanwalt Sheldon Greene, 1976. Die Entsorgung von Americas Public Lands Bald nach der Revolution, begann die amerikanische Regierung, einen Großteil des Kontinents in Privateigentum zu übertragen. Mehr als eine Milliarde Hektar wurden an Kriegsveteranen und andere Personen für ihren Dienst an die Nation vergeben, die den Staaten für die Entwicklung ihrer Ausbildungs - und Verkehrssysteme gewährt wurde, an Einzelpersonen zum Homesteading und an Unternehmen, um Wasser, Holz und Bodenschätze zu entwickeln Für die Nation. Gesetze zur Übergabe von öffentlichen Grundstücken an private Hände umfassten das Landesgesetz von 1796, das 1841 Preemption Act, das 1862 Homestead Act, das Allgemeine Mineralgesetz von 1872, die Desert Lands und die Timber Amp Stone Acts in den 1870er Jahren. Die Gesetze haben es geschafft, den Großteil der öffentlichen Länder schnell, aber nicht immer, wie wir sehen werden, der Öffentlichkeit preiszugeben. In den späten 1880er Jahren wurden die Landgesetze revidiert oder aufgehoben, weil das Ende in Sicht war für die Beseitigung von Americas öffentlichen Ländern. Als Rechtsanwalt und Landreformator hat Sheldon Greene beschrieben, Während seiner ersten hundert Jahre sollte das Werk der Vereinigten Staaten sein Land in Besitz nehmen. Die Kolonisierung und territoriale Ausdehnung der Vereinigten Staaten waren, einfach gesagt, ein kolossales Landrausch. Eine solche Übertragung von Reichtum wurde nicht ohne Spekulation, Gier und völliger Betrug erreicht. Während des Großteils der Siedlungs - und Vorkriegs - und Gehöft-Epochen war die Korruption im Landverkehr die Regel und nicht die Ausnahme. Der Chef des US-Außenministeriums, die Agentur, die die Bundesländer ausbezahlt hat, schätzte, dass im Jahr 1883 Betrug 40 Prozent der 5-jährigen Gehöfte, 90 Prozent der Holzansprüche und 100 Prozent der Preemption und pendelte Homestead Ansprüche entfielen. Eine Umfrage von 1910 schätzte, dass 90 Prozent der Vorkommen und Gehöfte in Wisconsin tatsächlich für Holz erworben wurden. In den 1880er Jahren lag die Geschwindigkeit für Dummy-Einsteiger von 50 bis 125 könnte man einen Zeugen für 25 kaufen. Greed und Abfälle so charakterisiert die Ära, dass es die Great Barbecue genannt wurde. Die Entsorgung des öffentlichen Raumes war untrennbar mit dem vergoldeten Zeitalter, den Robber Barons, dem Wilden Westen und den anderen großen Mythen des amerikanischen Industriezeitalters verbunden, sowie mit den Dramen und Problemen, die sie umfassten. Viele dieser Dramen werden noch heute über das Land gespielt. Es ist der Zweck dieser Arbeit, um die Erfolge und Misserfolge der Bewegung zu revestieren die Eisenbahn Land Zuschüsse, und zu zeigen, dass, solange die unbeabsichtigten Imperien der Eisenbahn Land Zuschüsse weiterhin bestehen, die politischen, sozioökonomischen und umweltpolitischen Kontroversen Wird auch weiterhin, wie auch Optionen für die Behebung von Maßnahmen durch Revestierung der Länder wieder an die Öffentlichkeit. Tabelle 1. Verteilung der öffentlichen Grundstücke Art des Zuschusses oder Verkaufs Die Eisenbahn-Landzuschüsse Eine der umstrittensten öffentlichen Flächenverkäufe waren die Eisenbahn-Landzuschüsse, eine Reihe von Bundes - und Landesakten zwischen 1850 und 1871. Die vorgeblichen Ziele der Eisenbahn Land-Zuschüsse sollten die transkontinentalen Eisenbahn - und Telegraphensysteme aufbauen und dem Westen helfen. Die Eisenbahnkonzerne, oft bundesstaatlich gecharterte öffentliche Körperschaften, waren in Wirklichkeit Agenten der Bundes - und Landespolitik. Die Eisenbahnen würden, wie es gewöhnlich der Fall war, anstelle des US-Generallagers das Land an Siedler verkaufen und das Geld für den Bau der nationalen Verkehrs - und Kommunikationssysteme nutzen. Neben diesen öffentlichen Verkaufsbestimmungen gab es noch andere Bedingungen für die Landzuschüsse, einschliesslich der Errichtung der Eisenbahnen innerhalb eines bestimmten Zeitraums, der Eisenbahndienste auf Dauer und der Beförderung von Militär - und Postfracht zu ermäßigten Sätzen. Die Natur, das Ausmaß und die Umsetzung der Land Zuschuss-Programm wurde diskutiert heftig für viele Jahre. Befürworter der Landzuschüsse schlossen die Argumente ein, daß die Nation Militärwege für die indischen Kriege und den Bürgerkrieg benötigte. Der Westen war eine Wildnis, die erledigt und entwickelt werden mußte. Die Menschen brauchten Land, aber das westliche Land war wertlos, ohne von den Eisenbahnen zu öffnen. Landzuschüsse waren die einzige Möglichkeit, den Eisenbahnbau zu finanzieren, und die USA würden kein Geld verlieren, indem sie die Hälfte ihres Landes vergaben und die andere Hälfte für den doppelten Preis verkauften. Die Gegner der Landzuschüsse argumentierten, dass die Eisenbahnen nicht mit öffentlichen Mitteln subventioniert werden sollten und dass die Regierung die Einnahmen aus dem öffentlichen Verkaufsprogramm verlieren würde. Die Landzuschüsse waren weit über dem, was erforderlich war, um den Bau der Eisenbahnen zu sichern, und würde zu Unternehmensmonopolen von Land und Ressourcen führen. Sogar als die Debatte fortfuhr, begannen die Landbewilligungen, mit den Gegnern zu verwalten, die verwirklichten, um einzuschließen, was gedacht wurde, um Schutz gegen Misswirtschaft oder Missbrauch zu sein. Tabelle x. Schätzungen der Eisenbahn Land Grant Acreages Vor 1862 wurden die Zuschüsse über die staatlichen Regierungen neun Staaten gewährt fast 49 Millionen Hektar in Eisenbahn Land Zuschüsse. Im Jahre 1862, mit dem Aufkommen der interstate transkontinentalen Eisenbahnen, begann die Bundesregierung, die Zuschüsse direkt an Eisenbahnkonzerne. Tabelle 2 zeigt die größte der Landzuschüsse. Tabelle 2. Eisenbahn Land Zuschüsse über eine Million Acres Gesamtland Zuschuss Anbaufläche Drei Viertel aller Eisenbahn Zuschussländer wurden schließlich unter den vier Eisenbahnen gesammelt: der Nordpazifik (40 Millionen Hektar), Santa Fe (15 Millionen Hektar), Südpazifik (18 Millionen Hektar) und Union Pacific (19 Millionen Hektar). 1995 und 1996, nach mehr als einem Jahrhundert des Erwerbs und der Konsolidierung von Dutzenden kleinerer Eisenbahnen, wurden diese vier Eisenbahnen zu zwei verschmolzen: dem Burlington Northern Santa Fe und dem Union Pacific (die den Südpazifik erworben hatten). Die Eisenbahn Land Zuschüsse bedeckt zehn Prozent der kontinentalen Vereinigten Staaten, aber wegen der Korridor und Schachbrettmuster der Zuschüsse, ihren Einfluss erstreckt sich weit darüber hinaus. Ein Historiker schätzt, dass Eisenbahnkonzerne die Besiedlung eines Drittels des Landes und eines noch größeren Teils des amerikanischen Westens, wo die meisten Landzuschüsse gelegen waren, kontrollierten. Noch heute sind die größten Landbesitzer in vielen westlichen Staaten immer noch die Landgut-Eisenbahnen und ihre Erben. Ein Großteil des Landes wurde an neue Konzerne verkauft oder ausgegliedert, und das Vermächtnis der Eisenbahngelder des 19. Jahrhunderts ist eine bemerkenswerte und beunruhigende Konzentration von Landbesitz und Ausbeutung natürlicher Ressourcen, die der Kongress nie beabsichtigte. Die Kontrolle der Stipendien hat und fährt fort, in die ökonomische und politische Energie für die Korporationen zu übersetzen, die sie steuern. Wie bei den meisten öffentlichen Grundstücke, die Eisenbahn Land Zuschüsse waren mit Schweinefleisch Barrel Politik und Betrug. Maßnahmen, die begangen wurden, um den Bestimmungen des Landzuschusses zu entgehen, oder die Regierung, die Öffentlichkeit und die Eisenbahnaktionäre zu betrügen, schlossen ein: Bestechung von föderalen und lokalen Beamten. Drohungen und Gewalt gegen Beamte, Konkurrenten, Siedler und Jurymitglieder. Dummy-Einsteiger zu mieten, um den öffentlichen Verkauf Bestimmungen der Land Zuschüsse zu entziehen. Stock Bewässerung (Verkauf mehr Lager als das Unternehmen wert ist) und andere Formen der finanziellen Manipulation und Betrug. Illegales Konkursverfahren. Falsche Werbung in Grundstücksverkäufen. Umwandlung von Baugrundstücken zu Immobilien und Nicht-Eisenbahnunternehmen. Diskriminierende Eisenbahnpreise, die die Landwirte und andere kleine Verlader diskriminierten. Preis-Festsetzung, illegale Schmiergelder, und andere Sweetheart Angebote mit ineinander greifenden Unternehmen. Fehlende Umfrage und Patenterteilung Länder, um Grundsteuer zu umgehen. Holding von Stipendien für Immobilien Spekulationen und anderen nicht-Bahn-Zwecke. Stehlen von Holz aus angrenzenden öffentlichen Flächen. Schlechter Schienenverkehr und Abbruch von Abzweigleitungen. Monopolistische Agrarbusiness-Praktiken: Eisenbahnen kontrollierten Landwirte Transport, Getreide-Terminals, Hypotheken und andere Darlehen, und oft inspiziert Landwirte Bücher, um ihre Gewinne zu überwachen, und ihre Preise festlegen, was der Verkehr tragen könnte. Kontrolle der regionalen Wirtschaft und die Zerstörung von Kleinunternehmen. Abholzung und Verlust der Biodiversität. Giftige Abfälle aus dem Bergbau. Corporate-Regierung Austausch von Schachbrett gewähren Länder für noch mehr öffentliche Grundstücke. Einige dieser Probleme tauchten in den Jahrzehnten auf, nachdem die Zuschüsse gemacht worden waren und die Eisenbahnen nach mehr als einem Jahrhundert gebaut worden waren, während andere erst begonnen wurden, gehört zu werden. Aus zahlreichen Gründen, die von Kapitalmangel, grobem Gelände, schlechtem Wetter, technischen Problemen, Arbeitsproblemen, wiederholtem Bankrott, Missmanagement, Korruption und offenem Betrug reichten, wurden viele der Eisenbahnen nicht wie geplant gebaut Die siebzig Land gewähren Eisenbahnen ihre Bauzeiten verpasst. Zum Beispiel brauchte der Nördliche Pazifik, nachdem er wiederholt seine Fristen verpasst hatte, zwanzig Jahre (1864 bis 1883), um zu bauen, und behauptete immer noch Ansprüche für Stipendien im Jahr 1940. Am Ende nach den Bauausfällen finanzielle Zusammenbrüche, Prozesse und Verfall - und Korruptionsgesetzen wurden nur drei Viertel der insgesamt angebotenen Landnutzfläche auf die Eisenbahnen übertragen. Etwas mehr als 131 Millionen Hektar Bundesland, und fast 49 Millionen Hektar Land Land, wurden schließlich auf 61 Eisenbahnen, darunter 25 Prozent des Landes in Washington und Minnesota, 20 Prozent von Wisconsin, Iowa, Kansas, North Dakota und Montana, 14 Prozent von Nebraska und 12 Prozent von Kalifornien. Zwischen 1867 und 1890 wurden rund 35 Millionen Hektar von 20 Eisenbahnen zurück an die Bundesregierung, weil die Eisenbahnen nicht erfüllen ihre Land Zuschuss Anforderungen verfallen. Im Jahr 1916 wurden zwei Millionen Hektar von der Oregon und Kalifornien Railroad revestiert. Im Jahr 1929 verlor die Northern Pacific Railroad ihren Anspruch auf eine zusätzliche drei Millionen Hektar. Im Jahre 1941 wurden etwa acht Millionen Hektar zusätzlicher Landansprüche von den Eisenbahnen freigegeben, die im Austausch von ihrem Vertrag befreit wurden, um der Regierung diskontierte Schienenpreise zu geben. In der konventionellen Weisheit, war die Eisenbahn Land Grant-Ära vorbei. Aber indem wir die Geschichte des Verfalls verfolgen und ihre Leistungen und Misserfolge untersuchen, werden wir sehen, dass das Land-Erbgut sehr lebendig ist. Die Bewegung für Verfall gewinnt Dampf Der Bau der Landzuschussgesetze erwies sich als eine größere Herausforderung als der Bau der Eisenbahnen. Angesichts der Unzulänglichkeit und Absprachen des US-General Land Office, des Kongresses und der Gerichte, der Öffentlichkeit Ambivalenz gegenüber Korporationen, dem nahezu universellen Wunsch nach Privateigentum, der Verwirrung zwischen der Natur des privaten und korporativen Eigentums und der weit verbreiteten Glaubensannahme Schicksal und die Unerschöpflichkeit der Grenze und ihrer Ressourcen, ist es keine Überraschung, dass die Landbewilligung Politik war von Anfang an beunruhigt. Es gab Debatten über die Angemessenheit und das Ausmaß der föderalen Subventionen an Konzerne für den Bau von öffentlichen Straßen. Zwar gab es seit Jahrzehnten Landzuschüsse für Kanäle, doch das Eisenbahnunternehmen schuf die Kanäle. Nicht jeder hatte gleiche Begeisterung für den Bau Tausende von Meilen von Eisenbahnlinien durch die Wildnis des Westens. Die Debatte über die Notwendigkeit der Eisenbahnen wurde mit Debatten über die Staatenrechte und die Natur des zwischenstaatlichen Handels vermischt. Intertwined with these questions were the regional disputes of the 1850s, which stalled Congresss selection of the general routes of the railroads. With the onset of the Civil War, the Southern delegation left Capitol Hill in the hands of Northern politicians. Not surprisingly, then, when Congress passed the 1862 Pacific Railway Act, the first transcontinental railroad was the Union Pacific rather than the Confederate Pacific. The Northern Pacific followed two years later. Once a majority of Congress was persuaded that transcontinental railroads should be subsidized by the federal government, there were additional problems in the design and implementation of the subsidy policy. The land grant legislation itself was ambiguous and contradictory. It was poorly administered by the Interior Department, the General Land Office, and U. S. Forest Service, which often colluded with the railroad corporations to transfer excess land. There was an unclear and shifting jurisdiction between the legislative, administrative, and judicial branches, and all three branches alternated between indecisiveness and collusion. The unfortunate checkerboard pattern of the land grants had begun during the canal land grant era, and continued with the railroad grants as a concession to opponents both of land subsidies and of interstate railroads. Land grant proponents compromised by agreeing to grant every other square-mile section of land to the railroads. The rationale for this was that the governments sections would double in value because of their proximity to the railroad, and thus the government would lose no revenues from its own land sales. The reality turned out quite differently for a number of reasons, including the fact that ultimately, not all the checkerboards were sold by the railroads or by the government, and the fact that the government did not always receive the expected 2.50 per acre. The pork barrel nature of many of the railroad projects, which seemed designed more to line private pockets than to build rail systems, became apparent early on. In some cases, land grants passed from corporate shell to corporate shell, without the roads ever being built. With a rising Populist movement threatening more than land grant forfeiture, a divided Congress finally began to recover some of the unearned land - even before ending the handouts. Arguments for forfeiture were based on the views that many of the railroads hadnt been built on time, or at all, or had abandoned unprofitable lines. The railroads were actually delaying settlement by withholding land they were supposed to sell to the public the railroads should not be rewarded for their speculative holding of lands. The railroads received more land than they needed to construct and maintain the railroads the excess should be returned to the public domain. Opponents of forfeiture tried to defend the railroads, saying that the railroads had earned their grants, and the U. S. was responsible for fulfilling its part of the contracts. Revesting grant lands would deprive railroad stock and bondholders of their value. Many stockholders were widows and orphans. Some of the railroads claimed that the unsold lands should not be forfeited because the land grant legislation did not actually require them to sell their land, but only to dispose of it. Union Pacific Railroad mortgaged its lands to an affiliated corporation, and claimed that while the lands had not been sold to settlers, they had been disposed of, and so were not subject to forfeiture. The Supreme Court agreed in that case, but rejected that argument in the Oregon amp California Railroad case. The Northern Pacific Railroad made a similar claim, that in its 1890s bankruptcy, it had sold the lands - even though they were all sold to one of its own subsidiaries, the Northern Pacific Railway . Northern Pacifics land transfers to itself were also approved by federal courts. Forfeiture was not the only method used to try to enforce the public sale requirement of the land grants. Two other methods were the homestead clause and administrative action by the General Land Office. After 1866, land grants included a homestead or actual settlers clause requiring the sale of grant lands to actual settlers only, in maximum parcels of 160 acres, at a maximum price of 2.50 per acre. This clause was routinely ignored by many of land grant corporations, as well as by the administrative agencies and Congress. One of the most disturbing aspects of the land grant story is the continued failure of Congress to draft unambiguous legislation, and the failure of the administrative and judicial bodies to enforce the law. Occasionally, as in the Oregon amp California case, violation of the settler clause did result in revestiture. But even in that case, the railroad was paid for the land (at the rate of 2.50 per acre, as specified in the land grant contract), and the illegal sales were allowed to stand. The public sale provision was reemphasized in 1870, when U. S. Representative William Holman of Indiana introduced a resolution declaring that the remaining public lands should be held for the exclusive purpose of securing homesteads to actual settlers under the homestead and preemption laws. The House endorsed the resolution, but proceeded to grant another 20 million acres to railroad corporations in the next year. Holman became the shepherd of forfeiture legislation for twenty years. He introduced legislation throughout the 1870s and 1880s, and in 1884 sponsored a stronger resolution calling for the forfeiture of all expired land grants. He was also a principal participant in the compromises which led to the General Forfeiture Act in 1890. 75 Years of Land Grant Forfeiture The forfeiture of land grants began even before they were all handed out, and continued for 75 years. Twenty-six railroads lost 40 million acres. There were many reasons for forfeiture, and most of the forfeitures were enacted as separate acts. For simplicity, historian David Ellis has divided the land grant forfeitures into three periods, to which we may add a fourth and fifth. Period 1: 1867-1877: The Early Period of Forfeiture The decade marked the end of the land grants and the beginning of forfeiture. Wholesale forfeiture was restrained by the wish to complete the railroad system, and by the fact that many grants did not expire until after 1877. Total forfeited: 650,000 acres. By 1872, the Republican Party followed the Liberal Republicans and the Democrats in adopting a platform against additional land grants. In 1873, the Credit Mobilier scandal broke. The Credit Mobilier, a construction subsidiary of the Union Pacific Railroad, had bribed its way to success by giving shares of stock to the U. S. vice-president, the vice-president-elect, Congressional committee chairmen, a dozen Republican House and Senate leaders, and the Democratic floor leader. Millions in capital were missing, reportedly funneled into the Credit Mobilier. All this became public knowledge: The members of it are in Congress they are trustees for the bondholders, they are directors, they are stockholders, they are contractors in Washington they vote these subsidies, in New York they receive them, upon the Plains they expend them, and in the Credit Mobilier they divide them. Under one name or another a ring of some seventy persons is struck. Congress investigated itself, and censured a few of its members. UP stock fluctuated, manipulated by railroad financier Jay Gould, and the UP debt to the U. S. went unpaid. The affair left the public aware of and disgusted by financial and political manipulation on a grand scale. In the beginning, forfeiture was seen as an administrative matter in which the General Land Office could restore to the public the grant lands of a railroad which had failed to meet its construction deadlines. In 1874, the Supreme Courts Schulenberg v. Harriman decision made forfeiture more difficult by ruling that it required Congressional action. If the grant be a public one, it must be asserted by judicial proceedings authorized by law. or there must be some legislative assertion of ownership of the property for breach of condition. In other words, even when a railroad failed to comply with the land grant conditions (as they often did), the title to the land remained with the railroad if the government did not take positive action. Even when lawsuits or legislative actions were underway, the lengthy nature of these actions meant that the railroads could proceed to construct track and patent land. Citizen oversight did not exist, and government oversight was often tardy or nonexistent. In 1877, the General Land Office urged Congress to either extend the construction deadlines or take action to forfeit the unearned grants. In that same year, a decade before the Northern Pacific forfeiture controversy reached its full height, Washington Territorial attorney general McGilvra urged the forfeiture of NPs Cascade branch. Period 2: 1877-1887: Major Period of Forfeiture During this decade, while 21 million acres of grant land was reopened to settlement, many railroads managed to avoid forfeiture by continuing construction. Total forfeited: 28,000,000 acres. Railroads Forfeiting Grant Lands Iron Mountain RR (MO, KS) Oregon Central RR (OR) Texas Pacific RR Atlantic amp Pacific RR (MO, AR, to Pacific Coast) Jackson (MS) to AL Elyton to Tennessee River (AL) Memphis and Charleston Railway (AL, SC) Savannah amp Albany RR (AL) New Orleans to MS State (LA) In 1878, Representatives Joyce and Thurman introduced forfeiture legislation in the House the Thurman bill forced the Union Pacific and Central Pacific to create sinking funds to ensure repayment of their debts to the government. Ever-creative, the railroads themselves used forfeiture as a strategy against their rivals. For example, Henry Villard, who controlled the Oregon Navigation and Railroad Company, pushed for the forfeiture of the Northern Pacifics grant, until he gained control of the NP in 1881. Subsequently another NP rival, the Central Pacific, pushed for the forfeiture of NPs grant in the 1882 Casserly bill. In the early 1880s, Knights of Labor and the Greenback National Party urged forfeiture, and by 1884, both major political party platforms included forfeiture, though the Republican platform included a loophole for any railroad except those where there has been no attempt in good faith to perform the condition of such grants. In 1883, the Knights of Labor urged forfeiture. In 1883, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary suggested that the courts, rather than Congress, were the proper arena for forfeitures, but on January 21, 1884, the House passed, in a 251 to 17 vote, a resolution introduced by forfeiture champion William Holman. The resolution urged the recovery of all unearned grants, and gave priority to forfeiture bills on the congressional calendar. More than half of the 70 railroads were not built on time. By 1885, up to a hundred million acres of grant lands lay along late or non-existing track. These became the focus of the proposals for a general forfeiture act. The U. S. General Land Office The U. S. Department of Interiors General Land Office (GLO), as the administering agency for public lands, was a key to the failures and the forfeitures of the land grants. Created in 1800 to administer the transfer of public lands into private hands, the GLO was variously described over the next 150 years as underfunded, inept, andor corrupt. It was at times all of those, and played a key role in the implementation of the homestead and land grant policies. The GLO Commissioners report for 1872 admitted that the agencys substandard salaries made the agency merely a sort of training school for land lawyers and agents for railways and private land companies. The GLO training school had a revolving door which very well served those corporations. For example, both of the principals of the premier land law firm of Britton amp Gray were former employees of the GLO, and their brothers-in-law were chief clerk and assistant chief of the GLOs railroad division. Britton amp Gray represented the Atlantic amp Pacific Railroad in its unsuccessful defense against the GLOs 1885 revocation of unselected indemnity lands, but were quite successful representing the Northern Pacific during the 1920s-30s hearings and lawsuit brought by the U. S. government. The nemesis to the General Land Offices routine failures and collusion was William Andrew Jackson Sparks, a self-made attorney, federal lands office receiver, Illinois state representative and senator, and from 1872 to 1882, a U. S. Representative, where he was an advocate of railroad regulation. In March 1885, Sparks was appointed GLO Commissioner by Grover Cleveland. Sparks found the state of affairs intransigent as well as unacceptable: I found that the magnificent estate of the nation in its public lands had been to a wide extent wasted under defective and improvident laws, and through a laxity of public administration astonishing in a business sense if not culpable in recklessness of official responsibility. That the abuses of the public lands laws are largely due to inefficient administration, to the conduct of weak or corrupt officials, and to erratic and fanciful decisions, is undeniable but that the laws themselves are defective in want of adequate safeguards is also true. The vast machinery of the land department appears to have been devoted to the chief result of conveying the title of the United States to public lands upon fraudulent entries under strained construction of imperfect laws and upon illegal claims under public and private grants. Within a month of being appointed GLO Commissioner, Sparks suspended the transfer of homestead entries in 10 states. He recommended the repeal of preemption acts and other public land laws that cash sales should be stopped, and that land should be made available to actual settlers only. Sparks also abolished land lawyers access to GLO clerks, thus making bribery and threats more difficult. Sparks estimated that ten million acres had been claimed in excess of the land grant formulas, and in 1885 and 1886, he administratively revoked 97,000 acres of NP grant land in Washington state, and 1.5 million acres of Atlantic amp Pacific Railroad grant in California, but he failed to recover another 90,000 acres from the AampP in Missouri. Sparks also went after lands fraudulently claimed by timber corporations. Depredations upon public timber are universal, flagrant, and limitless. Whole ranges of townships covered with pine timber, the forests at headwaters of streams, and timber land along water-courses and railroad lines have been cut over by lumber companies under pretense of title derived through preemption and homestead entries made by their employees and afterward assigned to the companies. Steam saw-mills are established promiscuously on public lands for the manufacture of lumber procured from the public domain by miscellaneous trespassers. Large operators employ hundreds, and in some cases thousands of men, cutting government timber and sawing it into lumber and shingles. Under cover of the privilege of obtaining timber and other material for the construction of right-of-way and land-grant railroads, large quantities of public timber have been cut and removed for export and sale. In his 1885 report, Sparks specifically mentions two corporations: the Sierra Lumber Company of California, and the Montana Improvement Company (MIC). In 1885, Sparks accused the MIC of cutting 45 million board feet from public lands, but the proceedings were dropped when the federal funds allocated to the case were exhausted. What followed was a convoluted series of transactions and corporate reorganizations-a pattern that has come to characterize the land grants evolution. The MIC, actually owned by principals of the Northern Pacific Railroad and Amalgamated Copper, went through a series of reorganizations. Amalgamated Copper itself, which purchased a million acres of NP grant land in Montana in 1907, was soon reorganized as Anaconda Copper. In 1993, the Northern Pacifics timber spin-off, Plum Creek Timber, bought back much of the Anaconda grant land (which had since been owned by ARCO and then by Champion International). Plum Creek Timber currently holds title to more than 1.5 million land grant acres in Montana, 90 percent of the timber industry land in the state. In 1885 and 1886, the two largest forfeitures were enacted by Congress: the Texas Pacific lost 15 million acres in New Mexico and Arizona, and the Atlantic amp Pacific lost 10 million acres along uncompleted roads in New Mexico and California. In March 1887, Congress directed the Department of Interior (DOI) to adjust all the railroad land grants, a process which until then had been up to the discretion of the DOI. If upon the GLOs calculation, it was found that railroads had too much land, they would be asked to relinquish it if they refused, the U. S. Attorney General was instructed to bring suit. In May 1887, the General Land Office (GLO) ordered railroads to show why their unselected indemnity lands should not be revoked, and in August 1887, the Interior Department restored 21,323,600 acres from the Northern Pacific, Southern Pacific, Oregon amp California, and other railroads to the public domain. But public lands reform had its limits. In 1886, Sparks had attempted but failed to cancel 1.5 million acres of the Northern Pacifics land grant in Washington State. Much of this land was soon purchased by the Weyerhaeuser timber syndicate. Sparks continued to push, but his limits were soon exceeded, in another case involving Weyerhaeuser. Sparks calculation that the Chicago, St. Paul (formerly St. Croix) Railroad had an excess of 406,684 acres was rejected by Interior Secretary Lucius Lamar, who ruled that the railroad had a right to indemnity for 200,000 acres. Sparks again clashed with Lamar in 1887, ending hopes of a threatened suit against Weyerhauser over title to North Wisconsin Railroad indemnity lands. Having pushed as far as Clevelands administration and the corporations would allow, the tension led to Sparks forced resignation in November 1887. Sparks departure, instigated by the future Secretary of the Interior William Vilas of Wisconsin, was covered by newspapers, which included descriptions of Vilas timber interests. Sparks is famous for being impetuous, for having an excitable disposition, and for his crusading fervor. Sparks blunt style can be found in the Congressional Record . and in his annual reports, which are full of stories about the bold, defiant, and persistent depredators on the public domain. His sympathies were clear: The rights of the corporations have been upheld. The defaults of the companies have been voluntary. The rights of the public are now to be considered - the right of the people to repossess themselves of their own. The case is not one calling for sympathy to the corporations it is one calling for justice to the people of the country. One historian has observed, During his three years in office Commissioner Sparks established a record practically unique in Land Office history. He attempted with considerable vigor to improve the methods, practices, and conditions of the Office. At times he blundered, but there is no question of his honesty. He worked with hope that he could secure Congressional assistance, but Congress only confronted him with additional handicaps. One wonders, given the legal and political atmosphere during the wholesale disposal of the public lands, and given the state of the General Land Office, if an effective reformer might not have blundered. Sparks honesty and willingness to act boldly were what the GLO most needed. Yet more than a century later, Sparks is still viewed from some quarters with condescension and ill feeling. During Sparks short tenure, Congress revested more than 28 million acres of railroad land grants, most of it from the Texas Pacific and Atlantic amp Pacific Railroads in New Mexico, Arizona and California. In August and December 1887, Interior Secretary Lamar had revoked 21 million acres in railroad land withdrawals and restored the lands to public entry. During President Clevelands administration, more than 81 million acres were (at least temporarily) restored to the public domain, land that had been seized, as Sparks put it, by illegal usurpation, improvident grants, and fraudulent claims and entries. But in the end, the value of the lands and resources made the transfer process impossible to control. Sparks removal from office in 1887 was followed by a backslide into frenzied patenting of public lands by corporations, guided by the cronyism of Interior and GLO executives, and covered up by the convenient disappearance of General Land Office records. The new GLO Commissioner explained in his annual report that he tried to make up for the delays Sparks had caused in transferring public lands to private ownership, claiming that the GLOs work had to be resumed so hastily that many of the records had disappeared because of bad ink. Interior Secretary William Vilas approved the speed-up in the work of the GLO, once issuing 3,633 patents in one week. His successor, John Noble, an attorney serving railroad, mining, and other large corporations in the Southwest, went even farther in speeding the patenting process, especially for timber cases, proving himself a true friend of the corporations dummy entrymen. GLO Commissioner Lewis Groff attacked Sparks reforms and did his best to downplay the fraud. By the height of the movement to revest railroad land grants, Congressmen were announcing that The great corporations and other monopolies have for many years been stretching out their strong and unscrupulous arms over the public lands remaining for enterprising and honest settlers. Millions of acres of this domain have been seized and stolen, and I have to say this robbery could not have succeeded without the collusion and cooperation of agents employed to protect the interests of the people. Immense combinations have been formed, including the ties of political and social life, for a common object-to break down all attempts at Washington to crush out a venal system which has flourished by departmental indifference or favor. But Congress steadfastly refused to improve the GLO, and the courts refused to enforce the laws. Open fraud by prominent figures, ignored by Congress and upheld by the courts, was accompanied by continued bribery and violence against government officials and witnesses. The Great Barbecue continued until there was little left. What was left, the Forest Reserves, had to be set aside by administrative order. The GLO was absorbed into the U. S. Bureau of Land Management in 1946, which continues to pass public land and timber to corporations. Congressional Committees and the Regulation of Railroads Several Congressional committees investigated the construction of railroads and the implementation of the land grant policy. The Credit Mobilier scandal of the mid-1870s has already been mentioned. In another investigation in 1887 and 1888, the U. S. Pacific Railway Commission investigated the Central Pacific and Southern Pacific Railroads, finding corruption, unpaid debts, missing funds, and missing receipts and other records. Other investigations, concerned with the ongoing operation of the railroads, led to the creation of the first regulatory agency: the Interstate Commerce Commission. In 1885 and 1886, the Senates Cullom Committee investigated various railroad abuses, including excessive and discriminatory rates, secret rebates, and manipulation of railroad company stock. The committees work led to the creation in 1887 of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) for the regulation of railroad operations. However, the ICC was stacked with railroad men, and with their usual creativity and ruthlessness, the railroads managed to use the ICC to their advantage. In an 1892 letter to his friend Charles E. Perkins, president of the Chicago, Burlington amp Quincy Railroad, U. S. Attorney General Richard Olney wrote: The Commission, as its functions have now been limited by the courts, is, or can be made of great use to the railroads. It satisfies the popular clamor for a government supervision of railroads, at the same time that supervision is almost entirely nominal. Further, the older such a commission gets to be, the more inclined it will be found to take the business and railroad view of things. It thus becomes a sort of barrier between railroad corporations and the people and a sort of protection against hasty and crude legislation hostile to railroad interests. The part of wisdom is not to destroy the Commission but to utilize it. Period 3: 1887-1894: The Push for a General Forfeiture Act The organized push for general forfeiture legislation was softened by land grant defenders in the Senate, who succeeded in limiting the forfeitures to lands adjoining uncompleted portions of the railroads. From 1888, the real focus of Congress was on passage of a general forfeiture act which would deal with the almost 100 million acres of grant lands alongside railroads which had not been built on time. Various versions of general forfeiture legislation were pushed and compromised by land reformers, rival railroads, their stock and bondholders, and by their lobbyists and representatives in Congress. A triangle of interests sought various degrees of forfeiture of unearned land grants. Three members of the House Committee on Public Lands agreed with the Senates stance that 5,600,000 acres of lands adjoining uncompleted railroads should be forfeited. The majority on the Committee sought forfeiture of 54,000,000 acres of lands adjoining any portions of railroads not completed within their time limits. Two members sought the forfeiture of all 78,500,000 acres of the grant lands of railroads which had not been completed on time. Having sought revestment of grant lands for 20 years, U. S. Representative William Holman now argued against radical proposals which would doom the legislation, warning that endless litigation would result. The middle ground was approved by the House in a vote of 179 to 8, but it was rejected by the Senate. Holman neednt have feared a radical law that couldnt be enforced. The General Forfeiture Act which did pass in 1890 was the conservative Senates version of less than six million acres, which Holman charged was sponsored by the Northern Pacific Railroad itself in order to avoid a larger forfeiture. In fact, the Northern Pacific, having acquired the existing Oregon Railroad line along the Columbia River, did not intend to build another, and had given up any claims to the adjoining land. The General Forfeiture Act reclaimed only 5.6 million acres from eleven railroads, including the Northern Pacific (2,000,000 acres), the Southern Pacific (1,075,200 acres), the Gulf amp Ship Island (652,800 acres), and the Mobile and Girard (536,064 acres). The fight in Congress was not yet over. In 1892, with the Populist Party calling for the return of all land held by railroads and corporations in excess of their actual needs, and all lands now owned by aliens, the House passed a bill which called for the recovery of all lands not earned within the time limits. The bills would have revested more than 50 million acres, but the Senate failed to act. The House passed a similar bill in 1894, even protecting innocent land purchasers by including an exemption for purchasers of less than 320 acres. The Senate again opposed the bill, with forfeiture opponent Dolph warning that vast interests, large farms, vast tracts of lands, the interests of the purchasers of the railroad companies. would be destroyed by further forfeitures. Of course, that was the point of forfeiture--to dismantle unintended empires. But Dolph represented powerful interests, and prevailed. Forfeiture historian Ellis marks 1894 as the end of the forfeiture movement, observing that the later forfeiture cases of the Oregon amp California and Northern Pacific Railroad grew out of special circumstances, and were different from the 1867-1890 forfeitures, which were based mainly upon the construction and time limit failures of the railroads. Period 4: 1908-1917: Oregon amp California Revestment The General Forfeiture Act of 1890 had marked the climax of forfeiture as a strategy to deal with the failures of the land grant policy. Later forfeitures, while large, concerned but two railroads whose failures were especially glaring: the Oregon amp California Railroad (by then a subsidiary of the Southern Pacific) and the Northern Pacific Railroad. The Oregon amp California forfeiture was preceded by the Oregon land fraud trials of 1903 to 1910. More than a thousand people were indicted, and more than 100 were convicted for defrauding the U. S. and Oregon state governments of land by forgery, perjury, falsification of records, bribery and intimidation of witnesses and officers of the courts, and obstructing free passages over public lands. Those indicted included the U. S. District Attorney, a General Land Office Commissioner and some of his agents, U. S. government surveyors, both U. S. Senators and a U. S. Representative from Oregon (including U. S. Senator Mitchell, who had been one of the staunch opponents of land grant forfeiture). Also indicted were Oregon State Senators, Assistant Attorneys for Oregon, city and county officials, and bankers, attorneys, lumber dealers, hotel owners, real estate agents, and stockbrokers. Wile convictions were relatively few, they were scandalously noteworthy, and resulted in the break-up of several land fraud rings, and in the repeal of the easily-abused lieu-land provisions of the Forest Reservation Act. The Oregon land fraud trials set the stage for a much larger case: that of the Oregon amp California Railroad. By 1908, the OampC, out of its grant of 3.7 million acres, had sold only 813,000 acres, and only 127,000 acres of that had been sold in parcels no greater than 160 acres, to actual settlers only, for no more than 2.50 per acre. The OampC had sold the other 700,000 acres, much of it to timber corporations, in violation of the law, in parcels of thousands or tens of thousands of acres, at prices up to 10 per acre. And in 1903, the OampC (by then a subsidiary of Harrimans Southern Pacific) announced that it would sell no more land at all. Investigators sent by President Roosevelt ended up on railroad and timber payrolls. Roosevelt eventually turned to Gifford Pinchot, who sent U. S. attorney Francis Heney, who successfully prosecuted some of the principals. After a series of Congressional acts and court decisions between 1908 and 1918, the Oregon amp California Railroad forfeited 2,900,000 acres. The revested acreage was transferred to the GLOs successor agency, the U. S. Bureau of Land Management (BLM), which sold most of the timber to corporations over the next fifty years. The OampC revestment set several important precedents. One was that railroads were not entitled to be rewarded for their speculation: with the backing of the U. S. Supreme Court, the railroad was paid only the 2.50 per acre it was supposed to have received. Another part of the revestiture proved quite agreeable to the purchasers of the railroads lands. In 1912, Congress passed the Forgiveness (or Innocent Purchasers) Act, which allowed purchasers of OampC parcels of more than 1,000 acres to keep the lands if they paid the U. S. government the 2.50 per acre originally required. Smaller purchasers werent required to pay at all. Period 5: 1924-1940: The Battle for the Northern Pacific The Northern Pacific Railroad received the largest of all land grants. Running across the northern tier from the Great Lakes to Puget Sound, the NP eventually claimed almost 40 million acres. In the size of its land grant, but also in its violations, controversies, investigations, and lawsuits, the Northern Pacific had no peers. In 1886, General Land Office Commissioner Sparks restored to the public domain 1.5 million acres of Northern Pacific grant land grant in western Washington, declaring that the 1870 amendments to the original 1864 NP legislation did not clearly and unequivocally grant additional land. Although House and Senate reports in 1884 recommended forfeiture of the NPs grant along the Columbia River, and there was a proposal in Congress to forfeit the Northern Pacific Railroads Cascade line, Sparks order was reversed by Interior Secretary Lamar in 1887. In 1888, a H. R. 9151, which would have forfeited three-quarters of the NP land grant, was passed without debate, but the Senate refused to act upon it. The Western Washington land remained under the control of the NP, and soon became the basis for Weyerhaeusers vast timber holdings in the Northwest. Instead, the 1890 General Forfeiture Act reclaimed only the two million acres of unearned NP land along the Columbia River, leaving most of the grant lands in control of the railroad. In the next two decades, the NP sold millions of acres to timber and mining corporations, including Weyerhaeuser, Boise Cascade, Potlatch, and Amalgamated Copper (later named Anaconda Copper). In 1905, the Northern Pacific had filed a claim for 5,600 acres within the Gallatin National Forest. In 1915, the GLO, having realized its error in issuing the patents, filed suit against the NP, but the U. S. Supreme Court ruled in 1921 that the government could not deny land claims that fell within forest reserves. The U. S. attorneys who worked on that case were soon brought in for a much larger job: investigating the entire 40-million-acre Northern Pacific land grant. Joint Congressional hearings were held from 1924 to 1928, detailing dozens of violations by the Northern Pacific Railroad, ranging from failure to sell the grant lands at public auction, diverting construction funds to non-rail purposes such as timber, mining, and real estate speculation, failure to sell stock to the public as required, tax evasion, and fraudulent classification of land. In 1929, Congress acted upon the Joint Committees recommendations by revoking NPs claims to another 2,900,000 acres lying within National Forests in Montana, Washington, Idaho, and Oregon, and directing the U. S. Attorney General to file suit against the railroad in order to have a complete judicial accounting and determination of any and all issues arising out of violations of the Northern Pacific land grant. Twenty-two charges were brought by the U. S. against the railroad. A complex ten-year case followed, with rulings by special masters, federal district courts, and the U. S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court left several major charges undecided, and the entire case was ended with a settlement between the railroad and the Attorney General. Northern Pacific agreed to pay the U. S. 300,000 and lost its claims to 2.9 million acres, but retained 39 million acres of land. 1941: The Railroads Release Further Claims Between 1867 and 1940, more than forty million acres of railroad grant land had been forfeited. On the eve of World War II, the railroads and the federal government had another concern: the requirement that the land grant railroads haul military freight at reduced rates. The U. S. Board of Investigation and Research, created by the Transportation Act of 1940, concluded that the ending of land grant rail rate concessions should be a two-way street, with the railroads returning their remaining lands to the government. So in 1941, with their eye on wartime profits, the land grant railroads released further claims on eight million acres, in exchange for being released from reduced rates for government freight. More than half of the acreage released was by the Northern Pacific, which surrendered 4,500,000 acres of additional claims. The Boards investigation provided the following list: Table 3. Patented Railroad Grant Lands in 1941 Atlantic Coast Line The Accomplishments and Failures of Forfeiture Law professor John Leshy has summarized the problems in the land grant policy, and of the attempts of Congress and the courts to address those problems. His conclusions are quoted at length because he is currently the Solicitor of the U. S. Department of Interior. Litigation has been. ineffective, even though the courts continued to acknowledge that the intent of Congress has been thwarted. In one celebrated instance arising shortly after the turn of the century, the United States sought to enforce a proviso of the OampC railroad grant, charging that the railroad grantee had retained most of the granted land and sold the rest of it in violation of the statutory size and price limits. After the Supreme Court agreed, Congress enacted legislation which revested title to the unsold lands in the United States but which, significantly, ignored those lands the railroad had previously sold to third parties in quantities or at prices exceeding the terms of the grants. Moreover, in taking back title to the unsold lands, the United States paid the railroad grantee the price the latter would have received if it had complied with the restriction by selling to settlers. Thus, even in this exceptional situation, which gave birth to the so-called OampC lands in western Oregon, purchasers from the railroad were fully protected despite their lack of bona fides . and the railroad suffered no actual penalty from its breach. Apart from this almost unique case, the restrictions in the railroad grants turned out to be largely unenforceable and ineffective. A basic problem was in the language of the grants: for example, the restrictions were not clearly labeled as covenants or conditions (a legally significant distinction), failed to set out a clear mechanism for transferring the land to settlers, and were silent both on remedies for violation and on their enforceability by the courts at the initiative of either the executive branch or potential settlers. These ambiguities eventually resulted in a series of Supreme Court decisions--such as the one allowing railroads to shield themselves from the duty to sell the lands simply by mortgaging them--which largely negated the restrictions. After years of wrangling, Congress and the executive branch together finally washed their hands of the matter on the eve of World War II. This is not to say that congressional attempts to include these restrictions were totally frustrated indeed, some of the land subject to the restrictions passed from railroad ownership, and small parcels actually were sold cheaply to those bona fide settlers Congress apparently intended to benefit. But even today railroads own large acreages that had been subject to these restrictions, and undeniably disposed of some of their grant lands in large tracts, at higher than statutory process, to other than actual settlers, all in contradiction of the ostensible purpose of Congress. The fact that some of the granted lands actually ended up in the hands of the intended secondary beneficiaries seems more coincidental than not. Was the public interest served by subsidizing the transcontinental railroads with public land grants Historians have argued convincingly that not only would the land grant railroads have been built without subsidies, but that the land grant railroads actually delayed settlement of the West. In the nineteenth century, the opening and settling of the West was widely assumed to be a public good bordering on absolute necessity. But it clearly benefited some more than others, and the wisdom of the land grant policy was ferociously debated even at the time. Another issue is the size of the land grants. Author Lloyd Mercer, who spent years analyzing the land grant subsidies, did his best to show that they were a profitable deal for the public, but he didnt factor in the billion of dollars worth of real estate, timber, coal, oil, gold, and other resources in his calculations. He also stopped his calculations at the year 1900, using turn of the century land values and rates of return. Even so, he concluded that the Northern Pacific grant was particularly excessive. The public (i. e. the settlers) should hardly have been secondary beneficiaries, as Leshy describes them. Yet the public has participated in its own defrauding. It is time for the public, through its representatives in Congress, to right the wrongs of a century. The Northern Pacific Empire Builder James Hill dismissed the controversies, claiming that When we are all dead and gone the sun will still shine, the rain will fall, and this railroad will run as usual. He may have been right about that. But as usual turns out to mean that the sun shines on deforested hillsides, and the rain falls in torrents and landslides, and trains are frequently derailed because of inadequate safety and manpower. The country can do better with its public lands and with its rail system. Perhaps a more realistic estimate has come from public lands scholars George Coggins and Charles Wilkinson: It is not necessary to chronicle fully the splendid indifference to the common public good in the matter of transcontinental railroads. When the Great Barbecue was over, Congress had given over 90 million acres to the railroads directly and another 35-40 million acres to states to be used by the railroads (in addition to another 200 million acres for other internal improvements, some of which were also granted to railroads). The progress of the first transcontinental line the Union Pacific and Central Pacific is somewhat typical of the problems generated. The Gilded Age was one of the low points of public morality in the United States, but its effects were not uniformly bad. As promoters, the railroads encouraged and directed immigration. The West was developed, and towns sprang up in the railroads wake. Opposition to the worst abuses was noteworthy and led to some worthwhile reforms. The railroad enterprise effectively ended the frontier. Pressure to force return of the railroad lands to the public domain has continued all through this century and has not yet died out completely. Nor will it, as long as the lands are controlled by corporations to the detriment of local communities, the public, and the land itself. As historian Fred Shannon wrote in 1946, If any lobbying is justifiable today it should be from a peoples lobby. It should demand that after three-quarters of a century (in some cases almost a century) of private profit from public gifts, it is now time for the people to take back the property without further recompense, so that in the future the benefits shall be reaped by the people who paid. Any reimbursement to the people made by the land-grant railroads such as reduced rates for government freight, to the present, has been just a little interest on the original obligation. The Land Grant Legacy Lives On The railroads and their defenders continue to claim that the land grant era ended in 1941. For example, railroad lobbyist Frank Wilner has argued that both Congress and the federal courts have ruled that the books have been closed on the matter of past railroad land grants. Many legal scholars disagree, and the U. S. Supreme Court itself, in the OampC revestment case, declared that the land grant laws are covenants, and enforceable. The grants must be taken as they were given. Assent to them was required and made. The acts are laws as well as grants and must be given the exactness of laws. This comment applies to and answers all the other contentions of the railroad company based on waiver, acquiescence and estoppel and even to the defenses of laches and the statute of limitations. Regardless of the pronouncements of railroad men, lobbyists, and judges, the land grant legacy clearly lives on, as can be seen by examining todays socioeconomic and environmental controversies in newspaper headlines, Congressional hearings, citizens petitions for return of the grant lands, land exchanges involving land grant checkerboards, and other efforts to address the continuing problems deriving from the land grant legacy. The days of robber barons, open fraud, and railroad wars are not over. The heirs to the land grant empires continue their control of the land, and their political influence. Timber and mining corporations which acquired railroad grant lands use their wealth to defeat state referendums for forest protection, to forward their own legislative proposals which give them access to additional public lands and exempt them from environmental laws, to squeeze independent companies out of business, and to price-gouge consumers, and to export forests and jobs. Citizen Pressure, Agency Hearings and Investigations As in the nineteenth century, the public pushes regulators, Congress, and the courts to understand and resist the political power of the land grant corporations. In 1972, the National Coalition for Land Reform (NCLR) filed a Petition for Return of Railroad Lands as an administrative complaint to the Secretary of the Interior. The petition asked the Secretary to investigate the status of the land grant-based corporations and their noncompliance with the law, an investigation which the petitioners were convinced should result in forfeiture or sale of the remaining grant lands, and reimbursement to the public treasury of profits derived from illegal exploitation of the grant lands. The Secretarys rejection of the petition was filed on August 31, 1972, on behalf of the Southern Pacific Transportation and Southern Pacific Land Company. A few years later, the non-profit Center for Balanced Transportation (CBT) urged Congress to conduct oversight hearings into the Interior Departments handling of the NCLRs land grant petition. The CBT, whose work encompassed national and state transportation and energy issues, had conducted historical and legal analyses of the Northern Pacific land grant, concluding that the policy had failed, but that Congress could still address the problems. In the early 1980s, the National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, backed by the National Grange, the National Farmers Organization, the American Farm Bureau, and the National Wheat Growers Association, called for congressional investigation into the obligation of the land grant railroads to use their land grant income to sustain and strengthen rail operations and the extent to which the carriers have breached their contracts with the government by transferring land grant assets out of the railroad without adequate compensation. Unhitching the Grants, Exploiting the Land In the 1970s and 1980s, as a result of a complex web of events, including the depletion of public lands resources, declining railroad profits, and railroad deregulation, many of the land grant railroads spun-off their land grant resources into new, independent corporations. The railroad mergers and restructuring inspired protest from rival transportation systems, railroad employees, citizens, and a new wave of hearings and studies by state and federal governments. The U. S. Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) conducted several studies on railroad mergers and holding companies. Its 1977 study on Railroad Conglomerates and Other Corporate Structures showed that land, natural resources, and other valuable assets (assets acquired over the years by government grant) had been diverted from the railroads transportation purposes and had diminished railroad revenues. The railroad as an instrument of public service has been deprived of wealth accumulated over many years, including resources such as land grants provided at public expense. The ICC concluded that the interests of conglomerate managements and their stockholders often diverge from the public interest in a sound transportation system, and that the continuation of asset separation poses a potential threat to the future health of the Nations rail system. In 1982, U. S. Representative Byron Dorgan (D-SD) initiated a Congressional investigation of railroads by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. Dorgan claimed that the Interstate Commerce Commission has adopted such a narrow view of its authority regarding rail holding companies and land grants. that it is doing virtually nothing to protect the public in these areas. This is why the ball is in the Congress court. It does not seem fair to expect our taxpayers to provide additional subsidies, and our shippers and merchants to pay exorbitant freight rates, while rail managements turn to other uses the subsidies they have already received. Nor does it seem fair to permit these managements to use the holding companies device to walk away from the bargain with the American people regarding the railroad land grants. Joint Congressional Committee hearings requested by Dorgan and Representative Pat Williams (D-MT) were followed by a bill introduced by Williams that would require all land grant railroads (or their holding companies) to put a third of their pre-tax profits from resource extraction into railroad maintenance. Williams declared that Congress must decide whether the public still has a right to demand service from the railroads as a result of the enormous grants of land they received in the 1880s. In 1980, U. S. Rep. John Dingell (D-MI), chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, requested that the Interstate Commerce Commission condition approval of the proposed merger of the Union Pacific, Missouri Pacific, and Western Pacific Railroads upon a study of the value of their land grants and mineral rights. Dingell wrote that it is unacceptable to have government aid diverted from its main objective of benefiting the ultimate public which the railroads serve. The next year, U. S. Representative Sieberling (D-OH), also concerned about the transfer of land grant assets to non-rail corporations, requested that the ICC continue its investigations of the effects of railroad holding companies which then spun off land grant assets to separate corporations. Calls for the investigation of railroad holding companies and land grant spin-offs also came from railroad employees and rival transportation systems. For example, the Water Transport Association claimed that the revenues and profits from land grant resources should be included when determining how much railroads should be allowed to charge for service. Additional challengers to Burlington Northern Railroads move to create a holding company for land grant assets included the Western Coal Traffic League, the State of Minnesota, BN employees, and a citizens group. In 1982 hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Railway Labor Executives Association expressed concern over the reduction of railroad plant and rail labor jobs due to the stripping of assets. The Western Coal Traffic League (utilities and industries) supported legislative initiatives to prevent the milking of the Burlington Northern Railroad of its resource assets, including its land grant assets. Congressman Pat Williams of Montana claimed that the land grant assets should come into play. BN ought to call upon some of its remaining land grant properties as a source of revenue with which to upgrade railroad lines in Montana. Continuation of service on the lines may or may not be profitable, but will be a public service, and public service was the intent of the land grants. Not surprisingly, Richard Bressler, the CEO of Burlington Northern, testified that his corporation did not recognize any continuing obligations, but hearings chairman Senator Max Baucus said I believe the federal government should determine once and for all whether the land grants created a continuing obligation for rail carriers to provide rail service. The conclusions of these hearings were backed by Congressional Research Service studies which reiterated the continuing obligations of the railroads, and the duty of Congress to determine just what those obligations were. Land Buy-Outs: Buying Back Public Land Though the grant lands were supposed to be sold to settlers, generally at 2.50 per acre, much of the land was held by the railroads or sold in large parcels to other corporations. Under the rationale that the public needs green space, some of the corporations are now selling the grant lands back to the public--at hundreds or thousands of dollars per acre. Table 4. Land Grant Sales to Public Agencies Every year, there are dozens of land exchanges around the country. Originally used as a way to deal with small private inholdings within public lands, in recent years the exchanges have become much larger, often encompassing tens of thousands of acres. Many of the land exchanges now being arranged involve the land grant checkerboards. Exchanges are a politically palatable way to consolidate the fragmented public-private land ownership patterns created by the railroad land grants. But in the process, public lands are being exchanged for land that had already been donated to the railroads--in effect, a second public land grant. Timber corporations, real estate brokers, and others are misusing the land exchange process in order to speculate for quick profits. Improper procedures, conflicts of interest, and bribery in connection with various land exchanges have led to four audits of the BLM and several ongoing investigations of the U. S. Forest Service. An investigative series on the abuses and problems with the land exchanges was published in the Seattle Times in 1998. The authors recommended several reforms, including (1) that exchange lands should be traded lands to the highest bidder, rather than to the corporation which suggests a deal (2) the land appraisals should be made public and (3) the public should be given a seat at the negotiating table. Many of the grassroots citizens groups which have arisen to monitor corporate-government land exchanges, including the Seattle-based Western Land Exchange Project, agree with these recommendations, and are working to expose land exchange abuses, and to ensure that reforms will take place. The land exchanges give a century-old court decision new relevancy: It seems but an ill return for the generosity of the Government in granting these railroads half its lands to claim that it thereby incidentally granted them the benefit of the whole. The names and faces of land grant reformers have changed, and the current issues may seem unique. But the goals and visions of the Farmers Alliances, the Populists, the conservationists, and all the others who have fought for democracy are alive. Their work to mitigate and reform the land grant policy continues, as it has for more than a century. What is missing from the scene today is an informed, aroused movement to revest the land grants themselves. An opinion poll during World War II showed that only half of the population had ever heard of the railroad land grants, and most of them thought the railroads had paid for the land. Since then, another half-century has passed, and the land grants have an even smaller place in our social memory. Without an awareness of the past, and an understanding of how it affects the present, we will continue to suffer the continuing impacts of the land grant legacy. Most of the recent attempts to correct or mitigate the problems unleashed by the railroad land grant policy are well-intentioned and necessary. They are also symptomatic treatments which do not address the underlying problem: a bad policy poorly implemented. As land reformer Sheldon Greene clearly stated, The economic interests of large landowners and railroads have prevented a broad-based distribution of public lands without proper regard for the public interest. Although 70 years now a century have passed since the bulk of our public lands were transferred to private ownership, the original distributive goal of the land laws remains unfulfilled. Yet, despite the lapse of time, it is still realistic to seek to attain this objective. As William Faulkner once wrote, history isnt dead its not even past. It is time to revisit the land grant era, an era which never ended. Its time to revest the land back to the public. The era of selling public lands to settlers is long over, but corporate control of land and resources has never been stronger than today. And the public lands have never been more in need of protection. Applegate, Rick. 1979. An Unintended Empire: A Case Study Of Rail Land Holdings . Pages 100-240 in: Additions to the National Wilderness Preservation System, hearings before the Subcommittee on Public Lands of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, House of Representatives, 96th Congress, 1st Session on H. R. 3928, held in Washington DC on Sept. 17, 1979. and oversights on land ownership in the Beaverhead and Gallatin National Forests, hearing held in Bozeman, Montana, Oct. 4, 1979. Serial No. 96-11, Part IV. 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